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Here are some characters that make you awesome:

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Top 4 Instagrams for BlackBerry 10

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BlackBerry: Brace Yourself For An Ugly Quarter

BlackBerry (NASDAQ:BBRY) reports quarterly results before the market opens on Friday. Analysts expect revenue of $794 million and earnings per share ("eps") of -0.04. Revenue estimates are down 19% Y/Y and flat sequentially. I am one of the biggest BlackBerry bulls out there, but I am bracing myself for an ugly quarter.

This Is Almost A Transitional Quarter

BlackBerry is still in the restructuring phase. The company has culled unprofitable handsets and cut costs amid a much lower revenue base. In the meantime it has transitioned to more revenue from services and handsets. However, the following issues remain:

Service Fee Revenue In Free Fall

CEO John Chen let the cat out of the bag when he said service activation fee ("SAF") revenue was expected to decline 50% to $800 million in FY16. SAF is a monthly infrastructure access fee billed to subscribers of BlackBerry 7 and prior operating systems. As the universe of BlackBerry 7 users has declined, SAF revenue also has declined. To be more in line with competitors' fee schedules, BlackBerry has had to de-emphasize these fees. Analysts have soured on the BlackBerry story ever since. There is no guarantee that BlackBerry can grow revenue from handsets and software rapidly enough to offset the decline in SAF. And that's what scares Wall Street analysts who crave certainty.

Handsets Could Be Drain On Cash Flow

Despite declining revenue and consistent GAAP losses, BlackBerry has been able to mute cash burn. The company has done this by cutting costs, laying people off, selling corporate real estate and keeping inventory levels low. Low inventory caused the company to be unable to fulfill demand for the BlackBerry Passport last quarter. To offset declining SAF, the handset division has to pull its own weight. I previously estimated that the company needed to sell 8 - 9 million handsets to reach its FY16 revenue bogey. That will require that Chen takes some risks on the inventory side, though.

This quarter I fully expect the company to build inventory in advance of demand for the BlackBerry Passport and BlackBerry Classic. If sales disappoint, it could create a drain on cash flow. In the past Chen has been prudent on managing working capital, but going forward it would make sense to take the cash flow hit from inventory build to fulfill demand and meet revenue expectations.

Software Revenue Not At Full Strength

Chen expects software revenue - mainly from enterprise mobility management ("EMM") - to double to $500 million in FY16. To entice customers to migrate to one operating system, BlackBerry developed an "EZ Pass" program which offered free upgrades to BES 10 for both new and existing customers. BlackBerry hopes to entice many of those EZ Pass customers to migrate to BES 12 and pay ongoing fees for the service. The company currently has about 7 million clients in EZ Pass, up from 3.4 million in November.

The company's best-in-class security is the one moat that it has; it can extend that moat by managing devices for the enterprise. This is BlackBerry's best hope to offset its declining ecosystem. The rub is that EZ Pass customers who re-up with BES12 do not go on subscription pay until next quarter. This is a long-winded way of saying, I expect software revenue to be underwhelming during the quarter.

Conclusion

With SAF in free fall and software revenue not expected to ramp up until the end of February, I am bracing myself for an ugly quarter. Investors may have to stomach a dismal fiscal Q4 to enjoy the upside to come. I am long the stock.

Here's whats new in BlackBerry 10.3.2

BlackBerry recently rolled out a beta of OS 10.3.2 to select users. The version available to them is OS 10.3.2.158 and it has a few new features and fixes.

Here’s the full changelog of what’s new in 10.3.2:

• S/MIME Support for ActiveSync – Import your S/MIME certificate into your certificate store and manage your secure email settings in the Hub
• Next Generation Enterprise Connectivity – improving performance and protocol for behind-the-firewall access (requires BES 12.2)

BlackBerry Protect

• Anti-Theft Protection: Ability to remotely lock, wipe and recover a device by logging into BlackBerry Protect. A device can only be recovered this way.

Browser Enhancements

• Anti-Phishing
• Private Browsing Mode

Hub Improvements

• Open the associated email when viewing an attachment
• Bulk clear recent contacts

Calendar Improvements

• Grow/shrink numbers based on how busy the user is during work hours (month view only)
• Add time zone previews while creating or editing an event
• BlackBerry Assistant – Interaction with the timer

Known Issues:

• [Clock] Alarm may reset randomly to a different time, recurrence may toggle, and description may appear corrupt
• [Hub] Hub settings may not be retained after an update from BlackBerry 10 OS v10.3.1 to 10.3.2
• [Input] It may take longer than usual to input text after starting the device
• [Active Frames] Content in minimized apps may appear distorted and stretched
• [Clock] Alarm configured via BlackBerry Intelligent Assistant did not go off at the configured time
• [Clock] After snoozing the alarm, the Clock application buttons may display in the bedside mode
• [Hub] If the device’s font size is larger than 14, speed triage actions may action the incorrect item
• [NFC] If bed time mode is enabled while an NFC Card Transaction occurs, the payment is received by the selector dialog is placed underneath the clock
• [Boot Up] Boot time can take up to ten minutes in some cases. If you see this issue, please let me know.

If you didn’t get invited to the beta, you can find the necessary files below, which will be needed to create an autoloader in order to install on your device.

Passport SQW100-1

HERE IS OS 10.3.2.281 FOR PASSPORTSQW100-1/2/3 – IT IS SHARED ON MEGA

Mirrored Files: Core OS and Rdio:https://mega.co.nz/#!jt4BACCI!oQpFud…GLVqbOJiQ_a0MI / App Files Only:https://mega.co.nz/#!TtBCWQjC!52w1ud…l1glycn7VGfC8o

Z30 & Classic

https://mega.co.nz/#!hJUmSIia!iNNT3D…kj8gRf_kZF0Jt0

Findings and Fixes are the same as Passport version.

THIS IS JUST THE CORE AND RADIO FILES. IF YOU WANT THE APPS AS WELL, YOU CAN DOWNLOAD THIS:

https://mega.co.nz/#!TtBCWQjC!52w1ud…l1glycn7VGfC8o

Q5-Q10 Radio [Mega]:https://mega.co.nz/#!VxB0RACC!6aaFDr…ypiQOJVcQvDjZc

Z10 STL100-2-3-4 Radio [Mega]:https://mega.co.nz/#!Z8JXwCSK!yWKi_I…PXKeO8iXhW7rLk

QC 8960 Core (Z3 Z10 Z30 Q5 Q10 CLASSIC) [Mega]:https://mega.co.nz/#!E9B3hJgB!e7eSD3…pcoeA0xOaGNdYY

Non-device dependant apps [Mega]:https://mega.co.nz/#!TtBCWQjC!52w1ud…l1glycn7VGfC8o

*DISCLAIMER* – This is an unofficial software release. There are no guarantees that it is stable. You may damage your phone. We assume absolutely NO responsibility for any damages that may occur. Install this leaked software release at your own risk. 

BlackBerry: Even The Bulls Are Giving Up On Hardware

Summary

• Recent bullish sentiment on BlackBerry acknowledges hardware weakness, but points to software and services as growth areas.
• Enterprise mobile device management is pointed to as an opportunity for BlackBerry.
• The ongoing collapse of the hardware business will probably force BlackBerry out of hardware some time in the coming year.

In anticipation of weak hardware sales for BlackBerry's upcoming fiscal Q4 report on Friday, the investment thesis of bulls has pivoted away from hardware. The focus is now on software and services, deemed to be areas of potential growth for BlackBerry (NASDAQ:BBRY). While possible, this outcome is unlikely, as enterprise embraces Apple's (NASDAQ:AAPL) iPhone, and the Apple/IBM (NYSE:IBM) partnership provides a more compelling mobile device management solution

Circling the Drain

A couple of bullish articles on BlackBerry have appeared recently on SA that basically say, "don't worry about hardware." Shock Exchangeacknowledged my observations about BlackBerry hardware sales, but argued that "network externalities" would stimulate BlackBerry's enterprise services business. Alex Cho was even more explicit in his exhortation to "ignore hardware" and focus on the company's software business.

Why do BlackBerry bulls want us to ignore hardware? Because the hardware picture is really dreadful. BlackBerry's phones are simply non-competitive. This is due in large part to the recycling of the commodity hardware paradigm by BlackBerry, which has become more and more untenable. BlackBerry phones use Qualcomm (NASDAQ:QCOM) processors, and not even particularly exceptional Qualcomm processors. Almost everything in the Android or iOS device worlds outclasses BlackBerry's best. This can be seen by going to the Geekbench website. In the chart below, I summarize Geekbench performance results for BlackBerry and some Samsung Android and Apple iOS devices (higher scores are better).

As a consequence, very few people are buying the phones. As of IDC's latest data on smartphone OS market share, BlackBerry had just a 0.4% market share in calendar 2014 Q4 and for the entire year of 2014. Market share is the percentage of new phone sales, and BlackBerry's rate of new sales is now no longer enough to support the BlackBerry OS ecosystem.

This can be seen in the continuing implosion of BlackBerry's hardware user base. As of the fiscal 2015 Q3 earnings report BlackBerry management acknowledge on page 3 of the Management Discussion section that the hardware user base has shrunk to 41 million. The chart below shows the contraction of user base and Services revenue since the baseline of fiscal 2014 Q1, when BlackBerry had a user base of 62 million and Service revenue of $794 million.

The hardware situation is unlikely to improve for fiscal 2015 Q4. The Kantar Worldpanel smartphone OS results indicate that BlackBerry's market share has continued to collapse in every major market throughout the world. Based on the Kantar data, I predict that sell through to end users will be about 2.2 million units, a y/y decline of about 35% from fiscal 2014 Q4.

Increasingly Speculative

In the face of the ecosystem collapse, the investment thesis on behalf of BlackBerry has become precariously speculative, involving predictions of where BlackBerry might be 10 years from now. I pride myself on a certain amount of foresight, but even I wouldn't venture that far into the future.

Bulls can point to the BlackBerry/Samsung (OTC:SSNLF) partnership and the Samsung-based SecuTABLET, but it's not clear how much revenue BlackBerry will derive from these. Mobile device management might be an inviting opportunity were it not for the hardware collapse. Yes, BES is cross-platform. So what. Here's the fundamental problem for BlackBerry.

As this report from Good Technology shows, enterprise is overwhelmingly choosing the iPhone. As the chart below shows, BlackBerry is in the 1% "Other" classification.

The report points out that iOS is particularly strong in "regulated" industries, with a 95% share of the legal industry, 82% share of the public sector and 81% of financial services.

The reason for this is that Apple has built an extremely secure smartphone operating system. Apple's encryption is so good that it wascriticized for being too good by the director of the FBI last year. Apple CEO Tim Cook went on to defend Apple at the White House security summit.

I often hear BlackBerry bulls extol the virtues of BlackBerry's security, and it's possible that it's even better than Apple's. But if the U.S. government can't break Apple's security, how much better does it need to be? The adoption of iOS by enterprise already provides the answer: BlackBerry's much-lauded security offers little added value.

If security doesn't provide an important discriminator relative to iOS, then that leaves mobile device management (MDM) as the last hope. But it's a false hope. The reason is the Apple/IBM partnership.

MDM has been a weak spot in iOS, and it hurt Apple in education last year. Apple realized that the adoption rate in enterprise was unsustainable without a better MDM solution, which is the reason for the IBM partnership. The IBM partnership provides enterprise-class MDM, as well as the support infrastructure that IT departments expect from IBM. The IBM partnership, combined with the high adoption rate of iOS devices, effectively slams the door in the face of BlackBerry's MDM aspirations.

What to Look for in the Earnings

BlackBerry typically doesn't highlight the user base number in its initial earnings release, so investors won't know that until the full report gets posted on line. Hardware sell-through will probably come in at around the 2.2 million units I'm predicting. The hardware story is almost a foregone conclusion.

What investors should look for is some sign of growth in the Software and Service segments. I don't expect any, however, because the growth premise is fundamentally flawed. I continue to regard BlackBerry as a short opportunity, although not for much longer. At some point in the fiscal first or second quarters, the hopes of the BlackBerry bulls will prove vain, and the price of the stock will collapse.

What will trigger the collapse? Chen has a decision to make, and he has to make it soon. Either BlackBerry gives up on hardware altogether, or it faces bankruptcy at some point in the coming fiscal year as it burns through its remaining cash. I'm betting that Chen will do the smart thing and get out of hardware. It's really the only way to save the company at this point.

But getting out of hardware will shake the faith of BlackBerry bulls to the core, and for good reason. BlackBerry without hardware is a muchsmaller company, and the cost of divesting the hardware business could be huge. That much smaller BlackBerry is not reflected in the company's current valuation.

BlackBerry: Ignore Hardware, It's Time To Focus On Software

Summary

• Investors have underestimated the upside in BlackBerry Enterprise Services.
• I estimate that its software business could scale into a $5B per year business by FY 2025.
• When operating at a 30% profit margin, that's a net profit of $1.5B.
• The numbers seem reasonable as the mobile handset market and the need for device management will grow in-line with the figures that I mentioned above.
• However, it's difficult to anticipate BlackBerry's market position, hence I model a scenario in which BlackBerry has 25% penetration, which seems reasonable in light of competent competitors.

Developing an edge in the markets takes a while, and while various strategies propose concrete ideas on what will likely drive business, I often find many fall short of the promised land, either because they're way too valuation focused or lack a concise idea on what will likely be an earnings catalyst going forward.

In the case of BlackBerry (NASDAQ:BBRY), I'm fairly confident that the growth catalyst will be software first, hardware second. None of the product offerings (Passport, Secutab, Bold) really excite me, nor did they generate the initial jump in sales that I was hoping for.

But…

The security service, i.e. BlackBerry Enterprise Services, is something that I find immediately relevant in a commercial setting as controlling information flow and ensuring containerization will limit the way data is manipulated and shared on devices. Also, financial services, technology and biotechnology do demand the protection of trade secrets, patents, and sensitive information, which will require more complex security software suites, as not all devices have finger print or retina scanners. Furthermore various anti-virus suites aren't a comprehensive enough of a solution as they are not a foolproof safeguard against employee data theft.

Despite the practicality of the software solution, the actual revenue is a "trickle" in comparison to other business units, and while I would argue that this could be the most valuable business ten years from now, it's currently early in its infancy, indicating that the valuation associated with it wouldn't be very meaningful as investors aren't going to price a premium on smaller yet promising business divisions.

Also, it's unlikely that investors are going to chase the stock on BES alone as we would need to see some stabilization in both hardware and services.

Software is small, and when I mean small, it's only representative of 6.8% of total revenue. Not exactly a precursor to gangbuster growth, right?

(click to enlarge)Source: BlackBerry

That's where John Chen interjects with a bit of dry humor on the current state of the business and its potential growth rate:

So I think, first of all, yes, I'm still on the path of doubling our software revenue the next year. So just to make sure we have gone through the numbers correctly, today we talked to you about $250 million. That's inclusive of licensing, license and technical support.

So if FY 2015 is roughly $250 million - $300 million (I'm offering a bit of a stretch in terms of the range of outcomes), the business is too small to make any meaningful dent into the company's earnings.

However further data indicates that there are bigger legs to growth going forward, which is where my excitement for this business comes from.

Supplemental data indicates that the MDM (mobile device management market) could grow at a much quicker rate. For example, a Forbes article mentions:

According to Radicati Group, a market research firm, the mobile device management market is expected to more than quadruple to $5.75 billion by 2018. Although BlackBerry is the current leader in the MDM space, with about 14.4% market share according to IDC, it is losing share to rivals such as MobileIron.

Admittedly, the lack of market share is a little alarming, but with such a large sales force, proven branding and competitive pricing, I'm willing to anticipate that BlackBerry can capture 25% market share when taking into consideration that it prices its silver license at $19 per user per year and gold at $60 per user per year. This indicated that if the projection is seemingly accurate, BlackBerry could scale software into a $1.437 billion business, which sounds a little far-fetched, maybe overly optimistic, but when dealing with early stage growth businesses, perhaps it's OK to anticipate bigger numbers.

That being the case, growing from $300 million in FY 2015 to $1.437 billion in FY 2018 implies a 68.57% CAGR. That being the case, if we assume that from 2018 onward the business scales from $1.437 billion at a 20% CAGR until 2025, we're looking at a $5.14 billion business.

The long-run growth assumption is based on broad-growth in cloud services in general and is intended to be a conservative measure following the initial stages of growth. IDC projects that SaaS will grow at a 21.3% CAGR over the foreseeable five-year period. So I model long-run growth on SaaS, as it's inclusive of more mature software business models, along with more recent ones.

Hmm… not bad, but is it actually attainable?

Well, let's assume the average license per year is $40 (roughly even split between silver and gold) that would imply 128.5 million licenses.

Whoa! That sounds crazy right?

Not really… as over a billion devices ship per year, and when we look at Qualcomm's (NASDAQ:QCOM) forecasts for device shipments, it's not that far-fetched of a reality.

(click to enlarge)

Source: Qualcomm

When working with Qualcomm's figures, there will be 3.6 billion handsets (running on two-year refresh in CY 2018) and if BlackBerry can penetrate into approximately 3.56% of the installed base of all devices (which is again an attainable figure).

Admittedly, I don't have an exact break-out on enterprise devices because enterprise devices are being replaced with a BYOD concept, i.e. bring-your-own device.

According to statistics from the International Labor Organization, the service sector is projected to employ 1.477 billion people by the end of CY 2015. I excluded data from the industrial sector, because it's not exactly clear whether industrials will find MDM software that useful as their CAPEX and OPEX leans towards capital goods (mechanical and less electrical components) and commodities.

So from my research, the potential market globally is approximately 1.477 billion devices, and selling 128.5 million licenses for BES 12, would result in a $5B+ a year business. At a 30% net profit margin, that would equate into $1.5 billion net income. A reasonable time frame for accomplishing this is around 2025, but it's not impossible for BlackBerry to grow sales at a higher rate than this.

Admittedly, my forecast is a little aggressive, but when it comes to software, it may pay off to wait for the tide to pass in a deeper part of the pool. Sure it's a little uncomfortable initially, but I think that there's a decent chance that investors are missing the true value of BlackBerry, which is in its software, not hardware.

There are emerging competitors, like Microsoft (NASDAQ:MSFT), which is set to release mobile device management software into the Office 365 suite. Admittedly, the functionality is somewhat limited, and quite frankly it's Microsoft's attempt at offering features to sustain growth in its office productivity business as a result of OS-license sales being negatively affected due to competing ecosystems that don't charge OS-license fees.

I would consider Microsoft a legitimate competitive threat because their software development teams have extensive experience in dealing with data security as an extension of their capabilities in the cloud via the Azure IaaS platform. There's also IBM with its own MDM offering (mobile as a service 360), but I question whether it will be truly effective as IBM doesn't actually operate a mobile handset division and is currently struggling with maintaining its software licensing business. There are a couple other noteworthy competitors that can emerge as big winners, but that doesn't negate BlackBerry's prowess as a data security provider as the company has won numerous government contracts for its handsets, which indicates BlackBerry's capabilities in MDM and data security shouldn't be underestimated at the present moment in time.

I reiterate my earlier buyrecommendation, but have no price target in mind

BB10 Rom for Android

Let's take the rumors that 10.2.1 final gets full play store access and blackberry is going to deliver a rom for a few high end android phones in the market that have an unlocked bootloader.

(note: all devices with a home button like Samsung has will not get bb10. only soft touch screen buttons will get it)

Would you stay with BlackBerry z10/q10/z30 or would you buy a high end quad-core full hd android device and flash bb10os over it?

Me myself would directly switch the the fastest android device on the market and install bb10os on it.

What would you do? Stay with an original BlackBerry but with outdated hardware.

Or switch to android device and install bb10os on it?